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AN EMPIRE WITHOUT AN EMPEROR? THE EU AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD 
1. Introduction
The metaphor of “empire” has not infrequently been applied to the European Union – most notably by Jan 
Zielonka (2006) – and there is indeed a growing, though not necessarily very well interconnected body of 
scholarly literature on the topic (see Behr and Stivachtis, 2016 and e.g. Waever, 1997; Gravier, 2009; Marks, 
2012). The extent to which the EU has been, or can be interpreted as an “empire” clearly depends on what 
is meant by it. The term is often used in a negative sense to indicate the “imperialist” ambitions and 
policies of the “Brussels bureaucracy”, allegedly to subjugate its member states or how the bureaucracy or 
the leading member states dominate the continent and some other parts of the world, particularly the 
former European colonies. On the other hand, there are people who see “empire” as a more positive 
concept, implying the diversity of the constituent units, with multiple loyalties and overlapping authorities. 
An example of this is Zielonka (2006), who defines the EU as a neo-mediaeval polity, or Robert Cooper 
(2002), who sees it as a postmodern one. Those who embrace ‘imperialism’ also stress the civilisational 
aspect of developed and enlightened imperial communities, although more often this mission is seen in a 
critical light. Even the EU Commission President Manuel Barroso once noted that “sometimes I like to 
compare the EU as a creation to the organisation of empire. We have the dimension of empire” (Mahony, 
2007). However, he distanced himself from the negative aspects of the concept by adding that “what we 
have is the first non-imperial empire”. Given these loaded meanings, it might be difficult to refer to 
“empire” as a purely analytical concept. Nevertheless, “empire” can be seen as a vast territorial unit larger 
than a nation-state, consisting of a centre and peripheries but often without definitive outer borders, or 
even more nominally as a territorial unit ruled by an emperor. If the EU is an empire in the former sense, it 
is definitively an empire without an emperor.  
The potential usefulness of the imperial metaphor is not necessarily connected to the actual power of the 
entity, as history has known both weak and strong empires. Recent events – the Ukraine crisis and Brexit – 
have mainly emphasised the weakness of the EU’s power, and the concept of “empire” is therefore used to 
search for analogies with the fall of the Roman Empire (see e.g. Yaroshenko et al., 2015). Yet even recent 
events can be interpreted as signs of strength. The EU has been accused of being the main culprit in the 
Crimean crisis because of its imperial ambitions in the Eastern neighbourhood, and Brexit can be seen as a 
reaction to the EU’s growing ability to penetrate even the big, nominally fully sovereign member states.  
The discussion of the EU’s role in international affairs – whether or not this is ‘imperial’ by ambition or 
effect – is inevitably related to the question of what kind of power it is (see e.g. Bull, 1982). The most 
typical view is that the EU is a ‘civilian’ power, or rather an economic one with primarily economic interests 
(see e.g. Damro, 2012). However, this view is increasingly contested by notions of the EU as a ‘normative 
power’ with universal normative interests (Manners, 2002) on the one hand, and a more traditional 
geopolitical power on the other (Hyde-Price, 2006). These notions, however, are all ideal-types and 
therefore the EU can appear in different incarnations at the same time. The attempt to capture the nature 
of the EU with one attribute may be fruitless. As Karen Smith (2008) has noted, studies on the EU should 
move away from the question of what the EU is, and turn to what the EU does, and what the activities of 
the EU do to others. The same problem is related to the concept of “empire”. 
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As the imperial metaphor tends to suggest, the EU clearly has interests and ambitions beyond its current 
borders. This, however, does not yet make the EU any more imperial than any other power, even small 
ones which also have international objectives. What gives the EU some ‘imperial’ characteristics is the fact 
that, throughout its history, it has also been involved in extending its territory. At the same time, the 
attempt to extend the scope of EU rules beyond EU borders by exercising ‘external governance’ has been 
manifest in both rhetoric and action (Lavenex, 2004). In its own view, the EU has been acting as a force for 
the good, and aims to extend normative orders which are regarded either as mutually shared or universal 
(Manners, 2002). This is, however, where the views of the EU tend to clash with others, and they do so 
particularly in the context of its eastern neighbourhood and in the case of Ukraine. 
During the past few years, a new discourse has emerged which regards the EU as a geopolitical player in 
search of its own material interest, ‘restoring classical imperial tropes of power relations between core and 
periphery’ (Sakwa, 2015: 563). The international arena, especially in the eastern neighbourhood, is seen as 
a zero-sum game which has, in fact, been created by the EU itself. The EU is allegedly driven by imperial 
ambition in terms of spreading its values and norms, though these are not universal and only help to assert 
its rule. The imperial EU can only be stopped by relying on harsh measures that send a message, as was 
done by Russia in the Ukraine crisis. For example, Julian Pänke (2015: 351) has argued that ‘the outbreak of 
violence in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood is the culmination of a foreseeable development since the end 
of the Cold War, when the EU initiated its attempts to establish a civilisational identity by externalizing its 
norms to the exterior’. 
This chapter will look at the EU and its eastern policies from the perspective of imperial metaphors and 
analogies (for an early attempt, see Wӕver 1997). In general, views of the EU’s role in its eastern 
neighbourhood vary greatly. As the Ukraine crisis testifies, the question of who was driving the EU policy 
which aimed to deepen cooperation between the EU and the countries in its eastern neighbourhood, along 
with the motives behind it, has been highly contested (see e.g. Kostanyan, 2017). This chapter first 
examines the background and evolution of EU policies in the East, starting with the Eastern Enlargement in 
2004, then moves on to explore the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, and finally 
discusses the EU’s conduct in the Ukraine crisis (see also Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016). 
 
2. The Eastern Enlargement 
The so-called Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, which took effect in May 2004, has been – and 
will most likely remain – it largest single round of enlargement. It consisted of 10 states, most of them 
former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as Slovenia, which was the first former Yugoslav republic to enter 
the Union, and Cyprus and Malta in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Bulgaria and Romania, which were 
deemed not yet ready to join the EU in 2004, were granted access from 2007.  
This ‘big bang’ enlargement of the EU was generally motivated by the noble goal of ending the division of 
Europe. It was often coupled with the idea that the rich western European states owed something to the 
eastern states which had remained captive on the other side of the iron curtain during the Cold War. Vaclav 
Havel’s speeches and texts at the time are quite indicative of the general mood, when he repeatedly called 
on the West to accept its responsibility, even if it entailed self-sacrifice. Havel (1994) forcefully argued that 
‘fear in the West of cheap Eastern goods, that fear of getting more deeply involved anywhere where there 
are no immediate gains, of that caution, that lack of imagination and courage, that love of the status quo … 
leads many … to lock them up in the world to which they have become accustomed.’ ‘If the West does not 
accept its co-responsibility for the world,’ Havel continued, ‘and find a key to the East, it will ultimately lose 
the key to itself’. By adopting the new members, the Union recognised the inherent European-ness of these 
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countries, demonstrated not only by their geographical location but also by their willingness to commit to 
the key European values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  
The critical question is, of course, whether such noble statements constitute the real reason for 
enlargement, or whether the rhetoric was only instrumental in masking more mundane aims such as 
geopolitical and economic interests (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003). Both factors were probably at play, 
but as Frank Schimmelfennig (2003) has argued, the rhetoric was indeed of key significance in determining 
the way in which the Eastern Enlargement took place. The collective identity of the EU rested on liberal 
values, and refraining from enlargement would have heavily contradicted these principles. Hence, the EU 
was bound to take the bold step towards enlargement, as the candidates had expressed a sovereign will to 
join the Union and had fulfilled the required conditions. The opponents of the enlargement were 
‘rhetorically entrapped’, since they could not veto the enlargement without simultaneously denying their 
declared identity and thereby losing their credibility as community members. 
There were indeed forces in some old member states that resisted the enlargement or wanted to postpone 
it. There were fears of the Union losing its effectiveness, and its established culture and identity, or that the 
enlargement would cost too much money in trying to support the economically weaker states in raising 
their living standards closer to those of the EU level. However, these voices were effectively sidelined in the 
course of the process. The strategic, geopolitical argumentation was largely marginal, apart from general 
references to peace and stability, since all the eastern European countries were also applying for 
membership of NATO, and joined it before their accession to the EU (Higashino, 2004; O’Brennan, 2007). 
Indeed, the EU enlargement was not generally seen as threatening Russia in any relevant way, nor did 
Russia consider the enlargement to be directed against its interests, except for the question of the 
Schengen regime, which caused problems for the Kaliningrad region as the inhabitants could not freely 
move from the exclave to the main part of Russia by land. It also restricted Russians in terms of travelling to 
the new member states, as they now required visas to enter (see Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016: Ch. 5). 
At the same time, some interests in favour of enlargement were not so noble. The British, in particular, saw 
the enlargement as a way of preventing the deepening of the Union and increasing its own influence 
against the Franco-German axis. Economic interests also mattered, since the new member states provided 
not only new markets but also a cheap labour force, in particular for German industry or, from a Marxist 
perspective, western European capital which could then also put pressure on wages and working conditions 
in the old member states (Anderson, 2009: 55). Yet, as mentioned above, the economic reasons were more 
often seen as an argument for postponing the enlargement, setting conditions for it and searching for 
means other than enlargement to foster economic cooperation.  
The enlargement process was not characterised by mutual bargaining but by a unidirectional process in 
which the EU monitored whether the candidate countries had fulfilled the standards it had set for 
admission, known as the Copenhagen Criteria. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law were seen as 
the key elements of these criteria, and particular emphasis was placed on minority rights. Hartmut Behr 
(2007) regards this as a sign of the EU’s imperial conduct. Yet the asymmetrical bargaining position did not 
depend on the coercive power of the EU but on the fact that the candidate countries wanted membership 
more than the EU did. Moreover, the candidate countries needed to harmonise their legislation with EU 
law. However, this was not much different to the previous rounds of enlargement. When Austria, Finland 
and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, they also had to accept the community acquis as a precondition of their 
membership. Indeed, as Georgeta Pourchot (2016, 27-28) has noted, the eastern Europeans were not 
asked to implement reforms which were any different to those already undertaken by the existing member 
states themselves, although it should be added that some of the old members had been able to negotiate 
exceptions and the new members had to accept a transition period for the free movement of labour. 
Moreover, Pourchot continued, once the new members had joined the Union, they were granted equal 
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rights in terms of sharing responsibilities of leadership and governance, such as holding the rotating Council 
Presidency some years after their entry into the Union. Or, as put by Tony Blair’s advisor, Robert Cooper 
(2002), who soon thereafter became Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the 
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union:  
In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no one 
is imposing anything. Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While 
you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given - a whole mass of 
laws and regulations - as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside 
you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, 
the end state might be described as a cooperative empire. 
The Eastern Enlargement was highly significant in its effects, since it helped to transform the new member 
states in fundamental ways (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Seidelmeier, 2005). As a consequence, it 
has become almost an axiom that the enlargement has been the EU’s most effective foreign-policy tool. Yet 
the EU has not been capable of influencing the political and economic development of countries which 
have not chosen the European orientation, even smaller states such as Belarus (Korosteleva, 2009). 
Moreover, the EU clearly had much more power during the negotiation process towards membership than 
when the countries became members. As the cases of Hungary and Poland now most plainly show, the EU 
has had more limited leverage over these countries since they have become members of the Union. 
In sum, the enlargement of the European Union to the East is in unison with the imperial metaphor to the 
extent that it involves an element of territorial expansion. However, the enlargement was not coercive and 
was in fact initiated by the new members themselves who wanted to join the Union. The EU, for its part, 
defined the conditions under which accession was possible, but setting these conditions was more a 
reaction to the perceived pressure to enlarge than an imperialist plan. The EU was then rhetorically 
entrapped in following an enlargement strategy based on its values rather than strategic and economic 
interests. The imperial metaphor also fails in terms of the fact that the new members were granted full 
membership rights and were not incorporated through distinct peripheral status. 
 
3. The European Neighbourhood Policy 
The EU had already started to plan a new policy towards its neighbouring areas before the Big Bang 
enlargement of 2004, referring to a “wider Europe”. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which 
covered both the former Soviet states in Europe (except for Russia, which opted out) and the 
Mediterranean countries, was set up on the basis of a Commission proposal in March 2003, and a strategy 
paper was issued in May 2004 (European Commission, 2004). This entailed promises of increased funding 
compared to the old programmes. The Neighbourhood Policy was clearly motivated by the Union’s growing 
political weight and ambition in international affairs in the early 2000s, as demonstrated by the adoption of 
the European Security Strategy in December 2003. It was also needed because the enlargement was about 
to bring new direct neighbours into the Union from the East, and they would face new barriers if their 
relationship with the Union was to remain intact. As the European Security Strategy declared: “It is not in 
our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits 
of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there” 
(European Council, 2003:7). 
At the same time, it was evident that the ‘old’ members wanted to set the agenda before the new 
members joined the Union. Their main concern was that the new policy should not lead to exaggerated 
promises of future enlargements or unrealistic budgetary commitments. The ENP was instead an attempt 
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to devise an alternative to further enlargements of the Union. Rather than full integration and institutional 
immersion, the ‘neighbours’ were offered wide-ranging cooperation, technical assistance and association 
schemes with the goal of extending the Union’s normative agenda. For this purpose, the mechanism of 
conditionality – “more funds for more reform” – was applied to relations with the non-candidate countries 
too. In return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning significant parts of national 
legislation with the EU acquis), the EU would grant closer economic integration and political cooperation 
with its partners. In several key respects the ENP resembled the accession process in bringing the 
neighbouring countries closer to the Union, but with one key difference: the golden carrot of full EU 
accession was not at any point seriously on the table. 
As with the enlargement process, it was clear which party was in the stronger position in the process, and 
able to define the scope and conditions of relations. The ENP did not give much meaningful say to the 
neighbours in setting the agenda. Despite the rhetoric of ‘joint ownership’, the objectives and the means 
were non-negotiable, and the only time the partners were consulted was when individual action plans were 
being agreed with benchmarks and timetables. This was nothing new as such, since the Union is known to 
be a rigid negotiating partner even in more symmetrical relationships, because of the bureaucratic ways in 
which its mandate has usually been set up. Yet in the Neighbourhood Policy there was clearly a hegemonic 
aspect to the way the Union conceived its mission; it was offering (or withholding) economic benefits 
according to the neighbours’ ability and willingness to implement the Union’s normative agenda. In other 
words, the EU was willing to give its neighbours influence basically only in terms of when they wanted to 
implement the Union’s demands, and not in terms of how this was to be done (Haukkala, 2008; Bicchi, 
2006; Korosteleva, 2011). The neighbours were not granted access to decision-making, apart from some 
more technocratic and policy areas such as air transport or transboundary water management, where a 
more network type of governance was adopted (Lavenex, 2008). Moreover, the EU’s insistence on the 
normative dimension involving democracy, human rights and the rule of law was based on the idea that 
these values were shared, and that the ENP countries had already committed to them in the institutional 
frameworks set by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Nevertheless, this aspect of asymmetric relations, and the EU’s ability to impose the agenda for the ENP 
countries, has led Pänke (2013; 2015) to conclude that the European Neighbourhood Policy was 
characterised by normative imperialism. Although the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law were all shared in principle, what these principles entailed and how they were interpreted in relation 
to actual policies was more problematic. 
Judging by its reception and outcomes, the ENP was not fully successful as a policy. In particular, the 
neighbours who wished to establish a closer relationship with the Union were not particularly impressed by 
the benefits of the Neighbourhood Policy (Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010; Korosteleva, 2011a and 2011b). 
Ukraine has been a case in point, repeatedly voicing its frustration over the lack of credible accession 
prospects, as well as the negligible level of market access and economic aid from the Union (Haukkala, 
2008; Sasse, 2008; Scott 2017). Many people had hence expected more effective ‘imperialism’ from the EU. 
By contrast, bureaucratic sluggishness, confusing demands and the perceived lack of local knowledge were 
common concerns of the partnership countries. Overall, the pace of reforms depended on the willingness 
of local elites to undertake them, and the EU had only limited opportunities to engage its preferred leaders. 
In other words, understanding the effect of EU policies is not possible without taking into account domestic 
politics in the neighbouring countries (Casier, 2011; Langbein and Börzel, 2013; Ademmer, Delcour and 
Wolczuk, 2016). At the same time, the lack of any serious progress in terms of reforms in many of the 
neighbouring countries made it fairly easy for the Union to defer making further promises of economic aid 
or other concessions. 
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In sum, the Neighbourhood Policy was created out of a mixture of diverse motivations, and it took multiple 
forms rather than a clear implemented plan. In terms of its territorial features, it resembled imperial 
aspirations in building a buffer zone of a ‘ring of friends’ and in extending its normative reach around its 
outer borders, making the borders controllable but fuzzy at the same time. Yet, as Christopher Browning 
and Pertti Joenniemi (2008) have suggested, the EU has followed different territorial models and 
conceptions of border in its Eastern Neighbourhood Policy. As with the enlargement policy, the EU acted 
from a hegemonic position in defining the agenda under which the eastern countries could cooperate and 
integrate with it. However, it did not have the imperial strength or will to coerce partner countries to 
cooperate with it, but depended to a great extent on the willingness of the local elites to choose the 
European orientation. The carrots the EU offered to the ENP countries were too small for them, as these 
countries preferred full integration, but the sticks were also too small to constitute any effective 
punishment for those who were not interested in approaching the Union. 
 
4. The Eastern Partnership and the revised Neighbourhood Policy 
The ENP was further developed in the course of time. The EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 
2009 on the basis of the Polish‒Swedish initiative. The initiative was partly a response to post-Rose 
revolutionary Georgia and Orange Ukraine, who were pressing hard for full accession perspectives. The EU 
also needed to preserve the initiative after Russia had increased its own attempt to influence 
developments in the region and had resorted to military force in Georgia. Yet it was equally clear that the 
EaP was also internally motivated, as a counterweight to the French initiative of a Union for the 
Mediterranean, launched by President Nicolas Sarkozy during the French EU Presidency in July 2008. 
Moreover, the initiative was to “ideologically enhance” the status of the eastern partners and offer them a 
membership perspective, since they were, after all, European states. Yet closer ties with the eastern 
neighbourhood countries seemed to be hampered by "enlargement fatigue’ within the EU. As the Polish 
Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski asserted, "We in Poland make a distinction between the southern 
dimension and the eastern dimension [of the ENP] and it consists in this -- to the south, we have neighbors 
of Europe, to the east we have European neighbors” (Lobjakas, 2008).  
Compared to the ENP, the main innovation in the EaP was the new multilateral platform which encouraged 
the convergence of the partner countries’ legislation, norms and practices with those of the Union. The 
practical implementation of the multilateral track has taken place through four thematic platforms: (i) 
democracy, good governance and stability; (ii) economic integration and convergence with EU policies; (iii) 
energy security and (iv) people-to-people contacts. The multilateral track has also provided for civil society 
participation through a separate forum whose results will feed into the thematic platforms. The EaP has 
achieved visibility and concrete substance through a number of regional flagship projects ranging from 
border management to energy efficiency and environmental concerns. Once again, political association and 
deeper economic integration were on offer for partner countries which advanced in the agreed reforms. A 
related plan was to encourage free trade within the region itself. Of concrete and most immediate interest 
to the citizens of the partner countries is the facilitation of mobility. The EaP is expanding on the 
established goal of country-by-country advancement towards visa facilitation and readmission agreements, 
with prospects of a dialogue on visas and the possibility of eventual visa freedom. Integral to the success of 
this path is the partner countries’ ability to deal with the challenges posed by illegal immigration and other 
border security-related issues.  
The EU also revised its neighbourhood policies in 2011 and again in 2015 in the aftermath of the Ukraine 
crisis. The new ENP sought to re-insert differentiation and conditionality into the process by adopting ‘a 
more for more’ approach, whereby the neighbours were more clearly rewarded for their positive efforts as 
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well as potentially penalised for the lack of them. The idea was to put less emphasis on the promotion of 
democracy as the core of the policy, and to offer instead a much wider framework under which flexible 
strategies of cooperation and integration could be applied (Schumacher and Bouris, 2017). At the same 
time, the EU was suffering from internal problems where both the Euro crisis and the trend towards 
renationalisation of member states’ policies limited the ambitions of the EU in the East. Nevertheless, there 
was more emphasis on geopolitical reflection in the framework of the ENP after, but not before the Ukraine 
crisis, though the policy revision still failed to provide a coherent long-term vision (Kostanyan, 2017: 142).  
In spite of the new frameworks, the Union’s eastern policy was plagued by internal contradictions and 
inconsistency. As George Christou (2010) argued, the EaP was based on the simultaneous and uneasy co-
existence of two binary logics, whereby cooperation and containment, alongside the essential securitisation 
of the eastern neighbourhood, effectively limited and prevented the EU from facilitating meaningful change 
through its policies. Tanja Börzel and Vera van Hüllen (2014), in turn, have stressed that the 
democratisation of (semi-)authoritarian countries entails the risk of their destabilisation, at least in the 
short run. Therefore they think that promoting effective and democratic governance has become a 
conflicting objective: “The lower the level of political liberalization and the higher the instability of a 
country, the more ineffective the EU is in asserting a democratic reform agenda in the ENP Action Plans, 
clearly favouring stability over change” (see also Wichmann, 2007; Theuns, 2017; Börzel and Lebanidze, 
2017).  
Others, looking at EU policy from the point of view of political economy, claim that the EU’s promotion of 
democracy is not the core objective but that its aims rest on the neoliberal model of market society, and 
therefore the relaxation of democratic principles followed quite naturally. The ‘fuzzy liberalism’ adopted by 
the EU advocated pluralism and support for independent civil society actors, but ‘a neoliberal set of 
concerns’ such as the ‘investment climate, excessive regulation, property rights [and] improved market 
access to public procurement’ seemed to dominate the discourse (Kurki, 2012: 152). Indeed, the EU’s 
policies in eastern Europe and elsewhere, involving the promotion of free markets, austerity and various 
neoliberal measures, has tended to aggravate social conflict rather than create stability (Patomäki, 2017). 
The effectiveness of the EU policies under the aegis of the ENP was thus limited at best and 
counterproductive at worst. There is in fact relatively little evidence that a change for the better has been 
achieved by the EU in and through its policies towards the East, and “the effect of EU influence under the 
ENP on the regime dynamics in [the] Eastern neighbourhood appears to be close to nil” (Buscaneanu, 2016: 
212). Democratisation processes have mainly stopped in the region. Part of the explanation is that Russia 
has increasingly contested the EU’s normative hegemony in the region and has challenged the EU view of 
democratic principles (Haukkala, 2008; 2016). Jakob Tolstrup (2013, 250), however, has argued that the 
positive impact of the EU has been one of preventing autocratisation rather than really pushing 
democratisation forward. Although the EU has been manifestly disinterested in pursuing spheres of 
influence and has, in fact, declined to frame its role in the East in this manner, the underlying reality has 
nevertheless been Russia’s insistence on framing the EU’s role in largely negative and competitive terms. As 
a consequence, the EU has been locked into an integration competition with Russia over Eastern Europe, 
although it has been both unwilling and ill-equipped to play this game. On top of this, the two have also 
adopted conflicting regime preferences concerning the countries in between, Ukraine in particular, with 
Russia pursuing increasingly coercive zero-sum strategies to win the key countries over (Smith, 2016). 
 
5. The EU and the Ukraine Crisis 
The Ukraine crisis has brought the role of the EU to the forefront, as it has been directly coupled with the 
question of who bears the main responsibility for the internal turmoil in Ukraine and the ensuing 
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confrontation with Russia (see e.g. Mearsheimer, 2014). Russia has repeatedly accused the EU of ignoring 
Moscow in the preparation of the Association Agreements, and has regarded the EU approach as unilateral 
and imperialistic, essentially forcing on the partners a false choice between the East and the West. 
Moreover, Russia claimed that the repeated concerns it raised with regard to the negative effects of the 
planned Association Agreements with the EaP countries were not taken seriously in Brussels. The EU 
officials, in contrast, asserted that Russia was kept in the loop and that the economic effects the 
agreements would have on Russia would be marginal and largely beneficial. For example, the Commission 
President Barroso argued that ‘the Russian government [including Putin] was informed about the details of 
the Association Agreement with Ukraine’, and therefore he should not have been surprised by it (Eder and 
Schiltz, 2014). Moreover, the EU repeatedly reminded Russia that the agreements were bilateral between 
the EU and its eastern partners, and that under international law third parties have no right to interfere in 
the conclusion of such treaties.  
From its own point of view the EU did not challenge Russia in the region, but it did implicitly contest 
Russia’s claim to have its own sphere of privileged interests. In practice, the EU had long acted in a manner 
that did not challenge Russia’s key role in conflicts, in particular when it came to conflicts in Georgia or 
Moldova. In the run-up to the Ukraine conflict, the EU had already been rendered quite timid in its 
approaches towards the region. It factored Russian sentiments and objections into its policies and shied 
away from developing responses that could be seen as threatening from Moscow’s vantage point. As a 
consequence the EU approach entailed tacit approval, and unintentionally lent support to Russia’s claims to 
its special ‘sphere of influence’ in the East. As Carl Bildt explained in an interview in March 2015: 
I think we should have reacted more strongly towards Russia when they started to 
misbehave in the summer of 2013. Clearly, when they started the sanctions against Ukraine, 
we didn’t see clearly the implications of that, and I remember that [former Polish Foreign 
Minister] Radek [Sikorski] and myself were trying to alert Brussels and Brussels was more or 
less asleep (RFE RL 2015). 
The EU had worked hard to strengthen relations with the Eastern Partnership countries by concluding 
Association Agreements, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The negotiations 
progressed with Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In autumn 2014, however, Armenia announced 
that it had opted for the Eurasian Customs Union instead, and only one week before the Vilnius partnership 
summit where the documents should have been signed, Ukraine also declined the deal with the EU after 
Russia had exercised political pressure and offered major economic benefits to encourage it to do so. The 
EU representatives were frustrated because of this last-minute cancellation, but initially it seemed clear 
that the EU had resigned itself to ‘losing’ Ukraine to Russia. Yanukovych’s decision was, in the words of High 
Representative Catherine Ashton (2013), greeted as ‘a disappointment not just for the EU but, we believe, 
for the people of Ukraine’. Although Barroso signalled ‘our political readiness to sign sooner or later this 
association agreement’, Ukraine’s refusal was nevertheless accepted as a fait accompli, as was Armenia’s. 
Despite some internal pressures to the contrary, the EU did not engage itself in a last-minute bidding war to 
try to win Ukraine over, other than abandoning its demand that Yulia Tymoshenko be released. Instead, the 
EU representatives announced that there would be no new benchmarks for the treaty, as the Ukrainian 
president Viktor Yanukovych demanded that he needed a bigger loan from the Union. ‘I feel like I’m at a 
wedding where the groom has suddenly issued new, last-minute stipulations’, said Chancellor Merkel at the 
Vilnius Summit (Spiegel Staff, 2014), without realising that the failure to achieve an agreement had any 
wider geopolitical ramifications. EU officials started to blame Mr. Yanukovych directly for the failure, rather 
than Russia, as he was seen as simply wanting free money and playing Moscow off against Brussels 
(Buckley and Olearchyk, 2013). This could, theoretically, have marked the end of all the drama over 
Ukraine, at least in the short term. Yet this was not to be, as the domestic unrest under the slogan of 
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‘EuroMaidan’ that started to gather pace in Ukraine from November 2013 onwards resulted not only in the 
collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, but also in a steadily escalating conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia. The EU leaders and officials did not expect such a popular uprising in support of the 
Association Agreement but they empathetically supported the protest movement, which they saw as 
reflecting a genuine European calling for the Ukrainian people (Burlyuk 2017) . Catherine Ashton, for 
example, visited the square in Kyiv and sent a message to the protesters: ‘I was among you on Maidan in 
the evening and was impressed by the determination of Ukrainians demonstrating for the European 
perspective of their country’ (Ashton 2013). 
The difficulties the EU faced in trying to strike the right balance between its normative and strategic 
interests in its eastern policy also became evident during the unfolding crisis in Ukraine and the conflict 
with Russia. On the one hand, there has been an imperative to show ‘strong political support’ for Ukraine in 
line with the adopted self-image and community values. This led to the hasty signing of the political 
provisions of the AA in March 2014 and the continued rhetorical support for Kyiv ever since. On the other 
hand, the EU has become increasingly frustrated with the Ukrainians’ dithering in terms of both 
implementing the Minsk Accords and engaging in significant domestic reforms. Political support for a more 
committed neighbourhood policy rests on a shaky basis. In a referendum, organised in April 2016, the 
Dutch voters rejected the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine by a clear margin. Although the 
Agreement was later adopted, the continued Russian destabilisation combined with the chronic economic 
and political weaknesses of Ukraine itself has made the prospects for a positive development in the country 
slim indeed. As a result, the EU is in danger of being locked into a situation where it must assume significant 
political and fiscal responsibilities over Ukraine, with a declining political will in the member states and 
weak perspectives in achieving any major success. This is probably part of Russia’s game plan in the conflict 
where Moscow hopes that by overstretching its capacity to engage Ukraine, the EU might in future be more 
easily persuaded to strike a ‘Grand Bargain’ on the future of the country which goes over the heads of 
Ukrainians after all (Lo, 2015: 111).   
The EU’s geopolitical role in the Ukraine conflict was thus rather complex and accidental, rather than based 
on straightforward imperial logic (Haukkala, 2016). The EU ignored the warning signals and failed to 
understand how seriously Russia took attempts to neglect its traditional role in its nearby areas, while the 
Kremlin started to exaggerate the EU’s role in the neighbourhood and attribute negative intentions to its 
anti-Russian character (MacFarlane and Menon, 2014; Casier, 2016). As Tom Sauer (2017: 90) has put it: 
‘the crisis has not much to do with Russian imperialism let alone Western imperialism. It has to do with lack 
of strategic long-term thinking…” Although the EU wanted to build a ‘ring of friends’, it focused in the East 
on the ‘low politics’ issues rather than ‘hard security’. The policies, once set up, were driven by the 
European Commission and there was no effective strategic coordination with the ‘high politics’ driven by 
member states. In that way, the EU inadvertently generated geopolitical side-effects through its policies 
(Gehring, Urbanski and Oberthür, 2017). 
In sum, although the EU did bear some responsibility for the outbreak and aggravation of the crisis in 
Ukraine, it is too sweeping a statement to explain the conflict as stemming from the imperial nature of the 
EU. First of all, the explanation borders on tautology in the sense that the imperial nature of the EU is first 
inferred from its expansionist policies in the East, and the policies are, in turn, explained by this imperial 
nature. Secondly, the Ukraine crisis also shows that the EU has been much more reactive and hesitant in 
expanding its presence in the East than the imperial metaphor suggests. Its ability to govern its 
neighbourhood has been limited, and mostly related to economic issues rather than traditional core areas 
of state sovereignty.  
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6. Conclusions 
This chapter has looked at the EU’s alleged imperial conduct in its eastern neighbourhood, with the aim of 
assessing how apt the metaphor of ‘empire’ truly is. EU policy has consisted of enlargement as well as 
partnerships with countries which are not necessarily aspiring to join the Union. The argument has been 
that the imperial metaphor only partially applies to the role of the EU in the East. First, the EU has been an 
‘empire without an emperor’. In other words, Brussels has not formed a power core with strategic 
leadership, but EU policy has been conducted by a number of agencies and networks and shaped by the 
member states. Moreover, the policy impact of the EU has been rather limited and mainly economic in 
nature, without a military or normative hegemony. Furthermore, the EU has often been rather hesitant and 
reluctant to expand its presence in the region, and its key policy decisions have been slow and reactive. 
Thus, the problems with the EU’s policy towards Ukraine were not a result of its imperial nature but the 
discrepancy between seeing itself as a normative power and its inability to drive the agenda through by 
economic means, let alone military. At the same time, the economic policies advocated by the EU 
contributed to the underlying problems as much as they were able to solve them. In this sense, the Ukraine 
crisis and the confrontation with Russia is not a story of two geopolitical empires competing over their 
limes, but a much more complex interplay of path-dependencies. 
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